Patents are intended to promote science and innovation by providing a reward for invention and an incentive for those willing to invest the time and money necessary to turn a nascent technology into a commercial product. Paradoxically, patents accomplish this by restricting access to the patented technology. Although the patent system is inherently a doubleedged sword, we as a society have concluded that the incentive benefits of patents generally outweigh their exclusionary costs. With respect to certain technologies, however, there is a concern that the negative effects of exclusion might outweigh any proinnovation justifications for the patent grant. In the realm of the life sciences, this concern has been raised particularly in connection with patents on "upstream" inventions, that is, patents that claim technologies associated with basic and early stage research and development, as opposed to patents covering "downstream" commercial products.
Research tools tend to fall within the category of upstream inventions. There is no single definition for the term "research tool," but it is generally used to describe inputs to the R&D process: the methods, reagents, and information used in biological research. Other examples of upstream inventions would include naturally occurring genetic sequences and polymorphisms, signaling pathways, biological markers, and the like, many of which might also be considered research tools.
The upstream invention designation can also be conferred on applied biological discoveries, such as the correlation between increased homocysteine levels and vitamin B deficiency currently at issue in a case (LabCorp v. Metabolite) before the U.S. Supreme Court. In the 1980s, researchers at the University of Colorado and Columbia University discovered a correlation in humans between increased levels of homocysteine and a deficiency in certain B vitamins. Clearly an important and useful discovery, but was this a patentable invention? The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") thought so, issuing the inventors a patent in 1990 that claimed a method for detecting a vitamin B deficiency by assaying body fluids for homocysteine and correlating an elevated level of homocysteine with lack of vitamin B (U.S. Patent No. 4, 940, 658) . In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard the LabCorp case. It found that the patent had been infringed by doctors, who used the method for diagnosing vitamin B deficiency in patients, and held the company (LabCorp) that performed the homocysteine assays on patient blood vicariously liable for the doctors' infringement (370 F.3d 1354; Federal Circuit, 2004) .
The LabCorp decision has been the focus of much criticism from those who see it as symptomatic of a troubling expansion of the patent system's definition of patentable subject matter. These critics argue that patents were never meant to cover the fundamental discoveries of basic research, such as the relationship between levels of natural metabolites in the human body. Permitting such patents hinders research and unnecessarily restricts access to technology. The U.S. Supreme Court has taken notice of the debate, and in a rare move has agreed to hear an appeal of the LabCorp decision to address the specific question of whether the patent constitutes an impermissible attempt to claim a "natural phenomenon or law of nature." Oral arguments were heard on March 12, and a decision is expected shortly.
Patents: The Boon or Bane of Researchers?
In the past, upstream inventions were often not patented, instead entering directly into the public domain to seed future innovation. However, in recent years there has been a trend toward the patenting of upstream technologies. This shift has been driven in large part by the increasing tendency of universities and other research institutions to patent the discoveries of their researchers. The Bayh-Dole Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1980, allows universities and nonprofit organizations to patent and commercialize inventions arising out of federally funded research and is widely viewed as having promoted the large increase in patents granted to universities (Rai and Eisenberg, 2002) . The original intent of the Bayh-
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Chris Holman 1, * Dole Act was to foster the dissemination and practical implementation of the fruits of federal research. By its nature, academic research tends to generate predominantly upstream inventions, and indeed many of the most controversial upstream patents have come out of university research. These include the University of Wisconsin patents on human embryonic stem cells, the Harvard/MIT/Whitehead patent on the master transcription factor NF-κB, and the Columbia University patents on the cotransformation process used in the manufacture of a number of important biotechnology products including Epogen for anemia and Activase for heart attacks and stroke. Another trend that is likely to have contributed to the increasing number of upstream patents has been a dramatic expansion of the universe of potentially patentable subject matter. There was a time when living organisms, computer software, methods of doing business, and basic scientific discoveries were all generally considered unpatentable. However, that has changed over the last 30 years, largely as a result of judicial decisions rather than actions by Congress or the Patent Office. Currently, living organisms, naturally occurring biomolecules, genetic sequences and polymorphisms, and computerimplemented bioinformatics are all being patented.
The Patent Thicket
Upstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in a "patent thicket," rendering it virtually impossible to conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 2002) . Although in theory a researcher should be able to license the necessary technology inputs, in practice it is generally not feasible owing to the large number of different patent holders, each with their own licensing agenda. Some patent holders will not even consider licensing their technology to competitors, and in the U.S., a patentee can virtually never be compelled to grant a license.
The problem is exemplified by the experience of the developers of "golden rice," a genetically modified crop engineered to produce elevated levels of vitamin A (Ye et al., 2000) . The project reportedly required access to technology inputs covered by over 70 different patents, and licensing the required intellectual property was viewed as a major obstacle to achieving success (RAFI communiqué, 2000) . In the end, the patent owners agreed to freely license the necessary technologies, probably because golden rice was being developed for humanitarian purposes to prevent blindness in children in the developing world and was not considered commercially viable. However, one can well imagine that this complex patent landscape could constitute a formidable impediment for a biotechnology company attempting to develop a more commercially relevant recombinant product.
Critics charge that the incentive effects of research tool patents are generally modest, and not offset by their substantial tendency to impede research and development. Because research tools are often the product of publicly funded basic research, it can be argued that most of these technologies would have been discovered and disclosed to the public with or without the incentive of a patent.
One of the primary justifications for patents is that they provide the necessary incentive for the investment required to transform a nascent patented technology into a practical commercial product. A good example would be the development of a candidate molecule into an FDAapproved drug. Without the incentive provided by a patent, pharmaceutical companies would be unwilling to invest the capital needed to develop the molecule into a drug and take it through the clinical trials required for regulatory approval. Conversely, in the case of many research tool discoveries, others are able to integrate the technology into their own research without incurring substantial downstream development costs. The incentive value of the patent is minimal and many would argue does not justify the patent's tendency to restrict access.
Some upstream patents cover fundamental biological principles, which may or may not fall into the category of research tool. For example, the discovery that NF-κB plays an important role in a host of different biological processes and signaling pathways was clearly an important scientific achievement. But this fundamental discovery became the basis for a patent purporting to cover any and all drugs that act by reducing NF-κB activity in a cell (Garber, 2006) . Many would argue that it is inappropriate to grant a patent for such an early stage discovery, when so much is left to be done before an actual drug can be made available to the public. Patents of this type can deter other researchers from developing a drug involving the patented pathway, without seeming to provide any significant incentive to innovation that would justify the cost.
Although upstream patents have been widely criticized, and there are a number of cases where specific patents clearly seem to have impeded innovation, there is little objective evidence to support a conclusion that patents constitute a widespread substantial obstacle to biomedical R&D, particularly in the academic sector. For example, in a recent study conducted for the National Academy of Sciences by Walsh et al. (2005) , only about 1% of the 398 academic researchers surveyed reported suffering a project delay of more than a month due to third party patents on research inputs, and none had found it necessary to terminate a project. Out of 17 industrial researchers who responded, the study identified at most one case in which a research tool patent might have stopped a biomedical research project. Many researchers reported that they were not aware of any patents covering tools they used in their research, but also that they typically did not check for relevant patents.
A Path through the Patent Thicket

A Legal or Policy Solution?
Although the Walsh study suggests that upstream patents are perhaps not as pervasive a problem as some might fear, it still seems clear that upstream patents can at times impede innovation more than they promote it. Nevertheless, there are a variety of legal and policy approaches that could address the problem.
For example, funding agencies such as the NIH could require, or at least encourage, funding recipients to forgo pursuing patents on certain upstream inventions, or make the technologies generally available under reasonable terms. This policy should particularly be applied to upstream inventions that would likely be invented and widely disseminated even without the incentive of a patent and technologies that would be generally useful as inputs in a variety of R&D contexts.
A change in the law might help in this regard. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, federal funding agencies are only allowed to restrict the patenting of inventions resulting from funded research under "exceptional circumstances." Furthermore, any determination of "exceptional circumstances" is subject to cumbersome administrative and judicial review processes, which are believed to deter agencies from exercising this option. Rai and Eisenberg (2002) have proposed that the law be amended to delete the "exceptional circumstances" language and to streamline the review process, thereby freeing the hands of agencies such as the NIH to discourage the patenting of certain upstream technologies. However, so far there has been no formal move to implement such proposals.
Even under the current statutory requirements, the NIH has on occasion promoted, and even mandated, open access to certain fundamental technologies, such as genetic sequence information. For example, in 1999 it published Principles and Guidelines for Sharing of Biomedical Research Resources, which explicitly discourage patents on certain inventions, particularly research tools, because of their tendency to "thwart utilization, commercialization, and public access" (NIH, 1999) . And in a number of funding grants relating to the human genome project, the NIH required that recipients forgo patent rights and dedicate genetic sequence information to the public domain (T.J. Roumel, personal communication).
Another approach to limiting patents on upstream inventions would be to narrow the scope of potentially patentable subject matter. In principle, "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable, but many upstream patents arguably cover fundamental biological principles. Examples might include claims directed to naturally occurring biomolecules, genetic sequences, polymorphisms, algorithms for analyzing biological information, signaling pathways, methods of diagnosing a disease state based on a biological marker, and methods for identifying drugs by screening for inhibitors of molecules or cellular pathways.
In deciding the LabCorp appeal, the Supreme Court could act to restrict the patentability of natural principles and fundamental discoveries. Thus, the decision could have significant ramifications for the patenting of upstream biological inventions. Congress on the other hand might step in at some point and address the issue, but as of yet it has shown little inclination to rein in the scope of patentable subject matter by statute. In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently held that genetic sequences are generally not patentable absent the disclosure of some specific, practical utility associated with the sequence (In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 , Federal Circuit, 2005 . That decision was welcomed by those concerned about the potential negative effects of patents claiming raw genetic sequence information.
Policing "Junk" Patents
The problem of upstream patents is exacerbated when patentees are permitted to claim subject matter that extends well beyond the scope of the disclosed invention. Consider, for example, a University of Wisconsin patent that purports to cover essentially all useful primate embryonic stem cell cultures, including human, based on the disclosure of one method for culturing embryonic stem cells from one species of monkey (U.S. Patents No. 5, 843, 780) . By law, an inventor is only allowed a breadth of patent coverage commensurate in scope with the disclosed invention, but the courts and the Patent Office have too often failed to adequately enforce this requirement. A more vigilant and coherent application of the disclosure rules by the courts and Patent Office to limit the scope of upstream patent claims could substantially attenuate the negative impact of some of these patents.
Not only are many upstream patents overly broad, some should probably never have been issued in the first place. There are a number of cases where broad upstream patents issued by the Patent Office have ultimately been found invalid in the courts, but only after expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable litigation. An example would be the University of Rochester patent purporting to claim the treatment of inflammation by specifically inhibiting the COX-2 enzyme, which the university unsuccessfully attempted to assert against Pfizer for marketing its COX-2 inhibitors, Celebrex and Bextra (University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916; Federal Circuit, 2004) . Fortunately, patent reform legislation is currently being considered that includes provisions intended to strengthen the patent examination process. For example, one proposal would permit interested third parties to submit references to the Patent Office that would assist the patent examiner in building a case for rejecting overly broad patent claims and patents claiming "inventions" that lack novelty or are obvious. Another proposal would establish a procedure whereby third parties could oppose questionable patents in the Patent Office, prior to commencement of an infringement action. The intent is to provide a relatively quick and inexpensive mechanism to nip improperly issued patents in the bud.
An Exemption for Research Use?
A "research use defense" in response to allegations of patent infringement during the course of research-sometimes called a "research use exception"-could substantially reduce the negative effects of upstream patents. Up until a few years ago, many researchers were under the impression that such a defense was available, shielding them from liability for incidental patent infringement incurred during basic research. However, in 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit largely disabused them of this notion in the landmark Madey v. Duke University case. The case was brought against Duke University by the former director of a laser research lab, who had been fired. Essentially, Duke University continued to operate the lab using technology that the former director had invented and independently patented prior to his employment with the university. (This is a far cry from the feared scenario where a university researcher is sued for inadvertently infringing upon a patent during the course of conducting basic research.) However, importantly, the US Court of Appeals decision held that the research use defense claimed by Duke University applies only to experiments conducted "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry," which generally does not include university research (307 F.3d 1351; Federal Circuit, 2002) .
In 1984, Congress did enact a limited research use defense for patent infringement that occurs in the course of generating data for submission to the FDA, sometimes referred to as the "Bolar Amendment." Pharmaceutical companies have pushed for an interpretation of the defense that would extend far back into the R&D process to cover even early stage drug discovery. At this point, it is not entirely clear to what extent the courts would agree with this interpretation, although the Supreme Court has recently held that the defense does apply to at least some preclinical research (Merck v. Integra, 125 S.Ct. 2372; . Although Congress could take action and institute a more general "research use defense," previous attempts have encountered strong resistance, particularly from universities and the biotechnology industry, the groups primarily engaged in the patenting and licensing of research tools. In view of this strong resistance, the passage of such legislation would seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Regardless of the legal status of the research use defense, academic researchers should take solace from the fact that as yet few if any lawsuits have been filed for patent infringement occurring in the context of basic academic research. For example, although the Madey v. Duke decision served to clarify the limited scope of the research use defense, the actual lawsuit only arose in the context of an employment dispute. For a variety of practical reasons, it will seldom if ever make commercial sense for a patent holder to sue a noncommercial academic researcher for patent infringement.
Another way to deal with problematic upstream patents would be for the government to compel certain patent holders to license their technologies for use by others. Although this approach is used in some countries, there has never been strong support for compulsory licensing in the U.S., where it is thought that compulsory licensing would substantially dilute the patent right and hence the value of a patent as an incentive for innovation. Nevertheless, under certain scenarios, particularly involving a serious threat to the public health, Congress might require the compulsory licensing of key technologies. 
Patents and the Public Domain
Changes in law and government policy are not the only avenues for addressing the issue of upstream patents. One way to preclude patents from restricting access to upstream technologies is to introduce the technology into the public domain before someone else has a chance to patent it. For example, fearing that the patenting of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) could form a patent thicket that would impede basic research and drug development, many of the major drug and life science companies banded together with the Wellcome Trust to form the SNP Consortium, an organization with the stated objective of discovering and publishing SNPs in the human genome as quickly as possible and in a manner that precludes other parties from patenting them (http://snp.cshl.org).
The HapMap International Haplotype Mapping Project (http://www. hapmap.org /cgi-perl/registration) took this approach one step further, making its human haplotype data freely available but requiring anyone accessing the data to agree to forgo filing product patent applications on any invention that relies in part on HapMap data. It is not clear how effective this approach would be because those who manage to gain access to the data indirectly would probably not be bound by the terms of the agreement, but it does show some creativity and an awareness of the problem.
Of course, a patent is only an impediment to research and development to the extent that it cannot be circumvented; if there are freely available alternatives to research tools, the problem of the patent thicket disappears. Thus, one approach to clearing the thicket is to develop work-around technologies and make them freely available on a nonrestricted basis. For example, Agrobacterium-mediated transformation is one of the most widely used methods for introducing heterologous DNA into plants. CAMBIA, a nonprofit group that promotes the use of agricultural biotechnology to improve nutrition and the environment in developing countries, determined that the patent landscape surrounding Agrobacterium-mediated transformation was impeding the development of genetically modified crops. They responded by developing a workaround transformation technology that does not involve the use of Agrobacterium and made the technology freely available to academic and nonprofit research organizations, or at a nominal cost to forprofit organizations (Broothaerts et al., 2005) .
Rather than merely introducing its technology into the public domain, CAMBIA patents it and makes it universally available under what it refers to as a Biological Open Source (BiOS) license ( http://www.bios.net /daisy/bios / BiOS_licenses.html). Licensees are free to use the technology and to patent any inventions developed using the technology, including improvements and new applications of the licensed invention. However, they must agree to make any improvements freely available to other licensees. CAMBIA asserts that this approach is preferable to simply putting the technology into the public domain because third parties can develop and patent new uses and improvements of public domain technology, creating a "picket fence" of intellectual property around the core invention. Essentially, open source is a strategy that uses intellectual property as a tool to promote rather than restrict access to technology.
In conclusion, although we might be better off with less patenting of upstream inventions, researchers will need to deal with upstream patents for the foreseeable future. Fortunately, in most cases these patents will probably act more as speed bumps than true obstacles to innovation. Nevertheless, there are legal, policy, and self-help measures that can be taken to alleviate some of the most pernicious aspects of upstream patents, and these should be seriously considered.
